Bush and defense

Bush and defense

More Cold War, or a true 21st century defense?

Mar. 7, 2001

The nation’s attention is focused on President George W. Bush’s proposed tax cut. As important as that is, however, his spending priorities deserve equal scrutiny. Nowhere is that more critical than with national defense.

Bush’s public pronouncements on defense have been largely limited to his repeated endorsement of a national missile defense – a scheme that is almost certainly unworkable and sure to be unconscionably expensive. Neither the perceived threat nor the tests conducted so far, which can be most charitably described as inconclusive, justify a decision to deploy such a costly and questionable system.

At the same time, however, the president has put in motion a review of defense policy that, if done correctly, could provide the catalyst for moving America’s defense structure into the 21st century. Its recommendations, and their foreign policy implications, should be the real focus of any discussion of defense spending.

The central reality facing defense planners is that the Cold War is over. The threat of global nuclear war has abated, but the world is still dangerous – and far messier.

President Clinton seemed to understand that, but did nothing to reform the Pentagon. As a result, the U.S. military retains much of its Cold War character. As if in parody of the conventional wisdom, the generals (and admirals) really are prepared for the last war.

Bush can change that. So-called top-to-bottom reviews of defense policy were conducted in 1991, 1993 and 1997, to no avail. This time, however, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has chosen Andrew W. Marshall to head the study. A long-time advocate of reforming U.S. force structure, Marshall has criticized Army units as too heavy and unwieldy; questioned the Air Force’s pride and joy, the new F-22 fighter; and suggested that the Navy’s centerpiece aircraft carriers be phased out before they become the horse cavalry of the 21st century.

Still, as with any large bureaucracy, the Pentagon has tremendous inertia. With billions of dollars at stake, defense contractors also have an interest in the status quo. And, there is a certain nostalgia for the simpler, neater analysis of the Cold War.

But the biggest obstacle may be the services themselves. According to Cindy Williams, a research scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, from the end of the Vietnam War until 1989, the division of defense spending among the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps) and Air Force was 29 percent, 37 percent and 34 percent, respectively. Since 1990, Williams says, "at most, 1 percent has migrated from one service to another."

That reflects the Pentagon’s continued Cold War structure. Moreover, it suggests that the determining factor in spending decisions is not national policy, but the balance of power between the services.

Breaking that cycle will not be easy, but Bush – flanked by Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and Colin Powell – is well positioned for the task.

Marshall’s report is due later this month. We should know soon after if the president is serious about reforming defense – or just wants to play Star Wars.